

20 APR 1994

Ref: 92-FOI-2308

Mr. William Burr  
The National Security Archive  
Suite 500  
1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Burr:

This is in reply to your Freedom of Information Act request dated November 4, 1992 (Archive File No. 921167DOD134). Our interim reply dated November 10, 1992, under the above FOI reference number, applies.

We have been advised by the Organization of the Joint Staff that the enclosed final report, entitled BETA I & II - 67 was located in response to your request. On review, portions of the document concerning military plans and operations, vulnerabilities and capabilities of systems, and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States were identified. As release of those portions reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, it was determined that the portions were currently and properly classified under Sections 1.1(a)(2) and 1.3(a)(1), (2), and (5) of Executive Order 12356.

Other portions were identified which contained recommendations and subjective evaluations made as an internal part of the decision making process. Release of that information would have a detrimental impact on participation in future war games and inhibit the policy formulation process of the Department of Defense.

Consequently, those portions have been deleted from the enclosed copy, and their release is denied by Major General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., an initial denial authority of the Joint Staff, under provisions of Title 5 USC 552(b)(1) and (5). You have the right to appeal the decision to deny the release of this information. Any appeal should be forwarded within 60 days of the above date to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), DFOISR, Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1400.

#652

Fees associated with the processing of this request have been waived in this instance.

Sincerely,

**SIGNED**

W. M. McDonald  
Director  
Freedom of Information  
and Security Review

Enclosure:  
As stated

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY  
COLD WAR DIVISION

3 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Robert S. McNamara, OSD

Subject: Final Report, BETA I & II-67 (U)

Forwarded is a copy of the Final Report of the senior-level, politico-military games, BETA I and II-67.

Additional copies of this report, the Game Documentation and the Fact Book are available upon request to this office. (OXford 5-3705 or 5-3715).

*Thomas J. McDonald*  
THOMAS J. McDONALD  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Cold War Division

Attachment  
a/s

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-4832

THIS CORRESPONDENCE STANDING  
ALONE IS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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# BETA I & II - 67

## FINAL REPORT

PREPARED BY

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APRIL 1967

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR  
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

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BETA I AND II-67

25 APRIL - 16 MAY 1967

FINAL REPORT

Prepared by

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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BETA I & II-67

FINAL REPORT

Foreword

This is the Final Report on BETA I & II-67, two senior-level, interagency, politico-military games conducted in the Pentagon during the period 25 April to 16 May 1967. The first volume, a Fact Book, was published prior to the game. A second volume, Game Documentation, contained the initial scenarios, team messages and scenario projections. This third volume includes a revised list of game participants, a transcript of the video-film summary and commentary of BETA I & II-67, post-Critique [REDACTED] and several game participants, transcripts of the Senior Critique and extracts from the Action-level Critique.

The object of BETA I & II-67 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with strategic weapons deployment, with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missiles.

In addition to this report, a classified, documentary-type film summary of BETA I & II-67 is available upon request.






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BETA I & II-67

FINAL REPORT

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BETA I & II-67

VIDEO TAPE SUMMARY

(Off-stage voice)

The following is SECRET -- Not for Foreign Dissemination. The material is hypothetical; based on two politico-military games conducted in the Pentagon between 25 April and 16 May 1967.

[REDACTED]

BETA I & II were senior-level, interagency games intended to explore the subject of strategic weapons deployment, with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missiles. They were not war games in the traditional sense, nor did they involve detailed analyses of weapons systems.

The BETA I and II worlds were drastically different from one another in order to examine varied psychological and political implications. Each of the crises stemmed indirectly from different US/Soviet deployment decisions regarding strategic weapons. Each game was intended to shed light on the impact different deployment ratios might have on decision making.

The technological and military assumptions, upon which the two games were based, were hypothetical. They addressed situations five years in the future which postulated two drastically different deployments of offensive and defensive weapons systems.

In each game, one team represented the United States and another the Soviet Union. A single Control Group represented all other nations, fate, nature, and influencing factors.

Senior participants for BETA I and II included representatives of interested departments, agencies and commands and recognized authorities from the academic community.

Now, I would like to introduce our [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Control attempted to limit its involvement to action which might logically have been taken by other countries and to insertion of other influences designed to keep the games moving forward. We tried hard not to pre-empt decisions of the teams themselves. Nevertheless, several critical injections were made by Control; hopefully, consistent with the philosophies and contingency guidance expressed to Control by the teams.

By its second move, BETA I depicted a situation in which the United States no longer enjoyed strategic force superiority relative to the Soviet Union. In BETA II, on the other hand, the United States had a very marked strategic nuclear superiority at the beginning, but both sides had anti-ballistic missile systems.

The game staff will now summarize BETA I and II.

#### SUMMARY OF BETA I

[REDACTED]

During 1967, US/Soviet arms control discussions had foundered. After weeks of frustration, the US delegation presented an analysis of comparative nuclear capabilities and announced its government had no intention of deploying an ABM system of any kind, nor would it deploy additional offensive missile systems or multiple re-entry vehicles.

[REDACTED]

Although the Soviets did not respond formally, in the months that followed, intelligence appeared to bear out these assumptions.

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The thaw in East/West relations continued as Soviet leaders cooperated in negotiations leading to a settlement in Vietnam and trade and cultural exchanges were expanded. US troop strength in Germany was reduced to three divisions, and by the end of 1969, Soviet forces in East Germany were reduced to fifteen divisions.


By 1970, the Institute of Strategic Studies in London appraised the relative US/Soviet position as one "of strategic parity". While the United States had greater numbers of nuclear warheads and launchers, the Soviets had a monopoly on ABM systems, approximate equality in total nuclear yield, and IRBM superiority in Europe.

In late 1970, in the atmosphere of detente, France, Italy and Iceland withdrew from NATO and the United States made a major reduction in its West German nuclear stockpiles.

In the United States, important progress was made toward the elimination of poverty, rebuilding the central cities and in social advances. There was also a rising tide of expectation throughout Communist Europe as production of consumer goods expanded and the Soviet Union granted increased autonomy to East Germany.

1971 marked the renewal of strained East/West relations as a new leadership in the Soviet Union tightened controls and re-emphasized Party authority.

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


On 21 April 1972, at Helmstedt, East German security guards halted a US convoy at the check point. No Soviet officials were present.


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As the United States protested to Moscow, all rail and highway traffic from West Germany to Berlin was held up. On 22 April, a Pan American airliner, with 165 passengers, crashed after colliding with a MIG in a "buzzing" incident.




During the night, the East German Army seized West Berlin in a lightning move. At the same time two US photo reconnaissance satellites were de-orbited -- apparently by Soviet anti-satellite vehicles.



The Soviet Premier responded that his country also desired a peaceful solution without territorial gains but time had come for a German settlement. He warned, however, he would not stand by if the United States continued military aggression against East Germany.

While condemning East German actions, the NATO nations were reluctant to support a military response and both France and Britain made diplomatic probes to determine real Soviet intentions.



Soviet and East German Army forces launched heavy counter attacks against the allied units. By darkness the US drive stopped and the airborne brigades were pinned down.

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# US/FRG THRUST




FIGURE 2

Meanwhile, France formally proposed a political settlement establishing West Berlin as a free city guaranteed by the two Germanys.

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The Soviet Union issued an ultimatum giving the United States 48 hours to cease its air attacks, withdraw from East Germany, and to confer on the French proposal.

The United States summarily rejected the ultimatum but failed to obtain more than moral support for military action from NATO.

[REDACTED]

As reports of the allied defeat reached Washington, American leaders felt a sense of shock and frustration and some advisors urged that negotiations be started.

[REDACTED]

Despite Soviet proposals for a cease-fire, after reduction of the US/FRG salient,

[REDACTED]

Although communist defenses were disrupted, many units were capable of counter-action and the Soviets responded with tactical air and missile attacks against US/West German ground units and military airfields in West Germany.

By dawn, on 10 May, the allied attack had made only a limited penetration into East Germany.

[REDACTED]

The Soviets decided it was dangerous to delay further recourse to their superior strategic capabilities.

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SUMMARY OF BETA II

BETA II also opened on 25 April 1972. Unlike the BETA I world, attempts in 1967 to forge an agreement regarding arms control had been unsuccessful.

The war in Southeast Asia escalated, with the United States imposing a naval quarantine. West European opinion generally opposed US war policies but, in West Germany, there was relief that a US/Soviet rapprochement had been blocked by events in Asia.

During the summer of 1968, hard-line elements in the Soviet Politburo accelerated development of MIRVs, depressed orbit ICBMs, and fractional orbit bombardment systems.

Communist China came under new leadership with the death of Mao. Managers and technicians assumed positions at all levels of the hierarchy. The Chinese continued development of thermonuclear weapons and missiles.

In response to the first test of a delivered nuclear weapon by the Chinese Communist Party, the United States announced initiation of a nuclear weapons program.

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Franz Joseph Strauss became Chancellor in West Germany on the crest of increasing German demands for greater influence in NATO. He had a clear mandate to embark on a more independent foreign policy.

In an attempt to meet German nuclear demands, and to placate the European allies without completely alienating the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to sponsor German representation in NATO nuclear planning at every staff echelon.

In early 1970, incontrovertible US intelligence indicated that the Soviet Union was committed to achieving strategic nuclear superiority. It also had been confirmed that the TALLINN system had not lived up to expectations and deployments would be halted at a total of 75 complexes.

In the Middle East, United Arab Republic and Israeli nuclear weapons programs were being pressed with outside help.

Although Japan increased trade with both the Soviet Union and Red China, it continued its defense treaty with the United States and showed an interest in acquiring an American ABM system from the United States.

Strauss made secret advances to the United States for support in development of a German ABM, pointing out that there were nine members of the nuclear club and that West Germany had the right to defend itself in a proliferating world.

Following this conflict, it was apparent that no German government could survive if it adhered to a strict, non-nuclear policy.

On 24 April 1972, in debate with a Socialist Opposition

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leader, Chancellor Strauss was provoked into declaring that West Germany was indeed embarked on a defensive nuclear program. He asserted Germany's inalienable right of self-defense and pointed out the logic of his policy in view of the nuclear arming of Egypt, Israel and India.

Following the blast, Communist Party Chairman Shelepin denounced the United States for continuing aggression in the Near East and Asia and for its support of the West German program of offensive nuclear arms. He claimed these activities of the United States had abrogated the Tests Ban Treaty. He pointed out that the detonation was a symbol of Soviet determination to prevent the resurgence of Fascism. On the same day, the Soviet Ambassador delivered a note to the US President calling for positive and immediate action by the United States to end the FRG nuclear weapons program.

On 26 April, the US President announced that the Soviet action was a violation of the Nuclear Tests Ban and Outer Space Treaties. He made it plain that the Soviets could not win an arms race with the United States and reasserted the reliability and superiority of US strategic forces.

In a private note to Shelepin, the President intimated that the US could scarcely apply hard pressures on the Germans when the Soviets were acting in such a provocative manner. The note held out prospects of talks on world security problems, including Germany, if the Soviets were more cooperative.

The French strongly denounced "German perfidy" in breaking its word regarding manufacture of nuclear weapons. Other NATO allies reacted in a similar manner.

Nevertheless, on 25 April, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were brought to full alert. On 27 April, the Soviets dispatched separate notes to NATO countries and the Senate of

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West Berlin demanding West German renunciation of its nuclear program. The Soviets expressed hopes for resumption of talks on stopping ABM deployments and reaffirmation of the Tests Ban Treaty. They asked the West Berlin Senate to dissociate itself from actions of the West German Government.


By the end of April, a rising wave of world resentment had failed to persuade the West Germans to stop their nuclear program. Intelligence indicated that German nuclear production was well advanced, using "break through" centrifuge techniques.

Strauss refused to give ground on West Germany's right to defend itself. It was apparent he had strong popular support.

On 1 May, the Soviets announced a selective blockade of West Berlin, cutting off civilian access to the city but not interfering with Allied military traffic. Supplies necessary to prevent starvation and disease would be supplied by East Germany and the blockade would end, either when Berlin dissociated itself from West Germany and its illegal nuclear program, or when Bonn gave up its nuclear armament.

As Strauss called for full support under NATO, there were increasing indications the West was disenchanted with prospects of a nuclear armed Germany.

Shelepin included a veiled threat of direct action in his May Day speech in Moscow. In response, the US President said that the United States "would invoke its guarantees under the NATO Treaty" if the Soviets intervened by force.




France called for an immediate cease-fire and European conference.


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Other allies reacted along similar lines. The unwillingness of Germany's allies to support retaliatory action against the Soviets created a cabinet crisis in Bonn and near-riot conditions in Munich and the Ruhr.



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Under pressures from all sides, Strauss announced on 9 May, he was prepared to call a halt to the German nuclear effort.

The Social Democrats called for dissolution of the Strauss government, appointment of a coalition caretaker government and immediate national elections.

(PAUSE)

On the heels of the crisis in Europe, North Korean and Red Chinese troops invaded South Korea.

# RED INVASION





FIGURE 4




CONCLUSION

The following material was prepared by the Game Staff after the critiques of BETA I & II-67. It is based upon comments of participants during and following the game.



The Soviet team thought time was their enemy and that, in two years, the United States could regain a position of superiority.



"one up". They seemed to be banking desperately on a Soviet loss of nuclear nerve which never came about.

[REDACTED]

(Commentator #2)

[REDACTED]

As the United States escalated and the Soviet team became more concerned with the prospect of a strategic exchange, the Soviets also became more determined to preserve Western Europe -- a vital source of post-war communist strength.

[REDACTED]

The Red team, however, in its contingency plans indicated that any such blow, regardless of "hot line" accompaniment, would constitute a mortal provocation.

(Commentator #3)

It was frequently remarked throughout the games that terms such as strategic "inferiority", "superiority", or "parity",

were meaningless short of the absolute -- the ability to limit casualties in a nuclear exchange to virtually zero or at least to a level within the historical experience of the nation. Following this line of thinking, the French Force de Frappe or the limited ICBM capability attributed to Red China in BETA II, would have been as significant as massive nuclear superiority.

It is worth noting, that both the US team in BETA I and the Russian team in BETA II were highly sensitive to their own ability to protect their civilian populations in an exchange.

(Commentator #1)

Someone stated that the initial BETA I situation could have occurred if ABMs had never been invented -- that the crisis could have stemmed from the Soviet Union deploying a more effective offensive nuclear force. This point was rebutted by assertion that a drastic change in the total numbers of Soviet offensive missiles or the introduction of MIRVs or other offensive weapons into the stockpile would be discernible to the United States over a period of time. In BETA I, however, a Soviet defensive system which had been considered mediocre suddenly turned out to be highly effective due to a technological breakthrough.

In both games, the team possessing strategic superiority, including ABMs, sought a negotiated solution without cornering its adversary.

(Commentator #2)


Although, the United States has adhered to the position that West Berlin is inextricably linked to the US national interest, BETA I suggests that a nation's willingness to assert such a vital interest is only as relevant as its ultimate military power. If this is the case, how may changes in the US/Soviet strategic balance affect US perception of its vital interests?

Someone speculated at the Critique as to whether use of nuclear weapons, as a demonstration of resolve, by a nation which is manifestly inferior in strategic weapons, can carry the message intended.



(Commentator #3)

Turning to BETA II, the political future of any German government hinged on obtaining some kind of ABM capability. Such a German demand appeared to be a logical concomitant of US ABM deployment. It was also noted that IRBMs are relatively easier to defeat with an ABM system than are ICBMs. The counter point was made, however, that a really effective US ABM would have restored the relationship between the United States and its Allies which existed during the early '50s. Europe would still be a hostage but the credibility of US determination would be enhanced.



(Commentator #1)

BETA 67 was not intended to come to grips with all of the main issues confronting US policy makers in the field of nuclear weapons technology. New phenomena, which may not be fully understood, have created an atmosphere of uncertainty with respect to offensive as well as defensive systems. Such phenomena as "hot x-rays" and electromagnetic pulse, as well as potential new hardware, including fractional orbiting missiles, low trajectory ICBMs, new developments in the field of radar and communications -- all contribute a dynamic new dimension to defense planning.

[REDACTED]

As one of the participants said at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, contributed by so many knowledgeable and responsible people in the preparation and conduct of BETA, was well spent.

In addition to raising new questions, the very fact that this particular game, designed to assess the implications of alternative strategic postures on US national policy, was held, is in itself significant. In past crises, we have taken for granted the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States and accepted the fact that this superiority provided implicit support for US crisis management. We have not had to use games of this kind to look at the implications, for US and allied interests, of enemy high nuclear threat levels.

With the growth of Soviet strategic power, however, and the initiation of new defensive as well as offensive strategic systems, it behooves us to analyze possible politico-military effects of a relatively lessened US superiority upon our ability to maneuver successfully through the shoals of international crises.

BETA II was, also, significant in that it was the first attempt in such a game to consider implications of a Chinese nuclear threat against the United States. Though more a problem of future concern, recent events suggest the need for very careful analysis of the implications of this threat to US security and of the means at our disposal to neutralize it.

(Off-stage voice)


[REDACTED]

The written Final Report of BETA I and II-67 includes full transcripts of both the Senior and Action-level Critiques, as well as post-Critique comments by a number of participants.

You are reminded that materials discussed in this presentation are classified SECRET -- Not for Foreign Dissemination.

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BETA I & II-67



Two key policy issues which were surfaced during the final Critique of BETA I and II-67 seem worthy of reiteration in this report. These issues went beyond those projected during Control group discussions. Both are interesting and seem deserving of further consideration.

The first deals with attempts to strike a posture of strength when dealing from a position of weakness. The essential point here is that the Blue team, in part to demonstrate its resolve, and hopefully to communicate a warning to Red of its serious intent to resist Red transgressions, chose to employ tactical nuclear weapons in two successive moves. The Critique disclosed that the Red team was surprised by the audacity of the Blue moves considering, as Red did, that Blue suffered from a military inferiority. In part, as a result of the Blue actions, the Red players claimed they were influenced in their decision to pre-empt strategically, feeling that in view of the incautious Blue response, the danger existed of a pre-emptive Blue strategic attack, even though this did not seem to be the most rational course of action for Blue to take.

With the usual general caveats about avoiding overly-precise generalizations or conclusions from the game play, it is interesting to speculate upon the broader implication that might be implicit in this interchange of moves and motives connected therewith. As mentioned in the Critique, one is at least inclined to wonder whether apparent demonstration of resolve to escalate in the nuclear field, when attempted by an adversary manifestly inferior in its strategic capacity, carries the message intended. In one sense it might be argued that Blue did convey the message to Red that it, Blue, was prepared to go to very great lengths to protect its position. While surprised, and maybe even impressed with Blue's fortitude, the Red team, rather than being deterred from pursuing its own ends, escalated the play perhaps more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case.

This is not necessarily intended as an argument in support of the logic of either team's actions. In fact, it seems probable that in real life both teams would have been much

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more cautious even though the stakes were high. Be that as it may, it does seem that there is an interesting strategic policy issue here which should be identified and which is worthy of further analysis.

The second item involves the relationship of "vital issues" to national power. In his concluding remarks at the Action-level Critique, one participant made a point which probably did not come out as sharply in the Senior Critique later in the day. To paraphrase those comments, he said he had had occasion to go back and look at President Kennedy's remarks the day after the Cuban missile crisis had ended. The President had emphasized that the US public should not conclude from that particular crisis that the Soviets would back down in all circumstances. The President noted in particular that, in the Cuban crisis, the United States had a distinct local military advantage and the issue of the Cuban missile emplacements was vital to the United States and less so to the Soviet Union. The conclusion, as it applied to the game, was that the Blue team had perhaps in retrospect not accepted realistically the effect of the 1972 local superiority in East Germany in relation to Berlin which the Red team enjoyed, nor the fact that the issue of Berlin had clearly been signalled as being of vital interest to the Soviet Union. The implications of his remarks were that a clearer recognition of these facts might have caused Blue to act more prudently.


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### GAME PARTICIPANTS' COMMENTS

The following comments were provided by BETA participants after the Action-level and Senior Critiques, conducted on 16 May 1967. Texts have been edited only to exclude duplicate material summarizing the games.

\* \* \* \* \*

 " .. The following general observations flow from the game play and my analysis of it, as detailed in the remainder of this paper:



In fact, there was a reverse correlation between strength and boldness: the stronger team, whether United States or Soviet, acted more cautiously in both games, and the weaker team more boldly. To the extent that this was not due to chance or personalities, might it indicate that the weaker side feels that, in the nuclear age, it "can get away with more" in reliance on a high threshold for nuclear war? Or could it mean that the desperation of nuclear weakness produces blind spots?

The teams tended to make their decisions rather simply, looking mainly at one or two factors and often neglecting the others. Systematic and full consideration of all factors was not the rule.

In BETA I, there was a fatal miscalculation by both sides of the others intent, culminating in a nuclear exchange which

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
neither side wanted. There was also a difference in atmosphere; i.e., a feeling of tension for both teams in BETA I, contrasted with a more relaxed mood in BETA II. Might this mean that, when the United States is strong, everybody is relaxed because they trust our conservatism; but, where the United States is weak, everybody becomes tense and sound judgment is impaired?

The Soviet teams used psychological tools effectively in both games, [REDACTED] In BETA II, quick and [REDACTED]


In searching for explanations of the unexpected results of both games, one factor might be the amount of time available to the teams. I could not help but think of the contrast between these games, where the senior teams spent a total of only 4½ hours deliberating, and the Cuban Missile Crisis where the "US team" spent a full week in almost continuous discussions, allowing them to give a thorough examination to every alternative. Of course, the long time in the Cuban case was due to the lucky fact that the United States had both ample warning and the initiative. In any case, adequate discussion time is an important factor when complex subjects with voluminous facts are up for consideration. As one senior participant remarked; "If the US team had had more time to talk, it probably would have decided not to use nuclear weapons after all". These considerations suggest arranging the senior game sessions to get more discussion time, perhaps by playing the whole game in one full day.

These considerations point toward more crisis games for senior players, with a bit more time devoted to each ...."


In BETA I, play starts in 1972, with the East German military suddenly replacing Russians in control of the autobahn and air corridor through East Germany to Berlin. Despite a




BETA I ends in an irrational cataclysm which neither side wanted nor intended. There are two major questions:



(2) Why did the Soviet team feel it must, through a pre-emptive strike, prevent a US attack on the Soviet Union which the United States, in fact, had never intended?



On the second question, regarding the Soviet imputation to the United States of an intent to attack, which in fact did not exist, the reasoning of the majority of the Soviet team



from all its European bases, including those outside Germany, was regarded by the majority of the Soviet team as a clear signal of coming attack on the Soviet homeland. An element in this thinking was that if the United States was willing to risk Soviet retaliation against European bases of its NATO allies, it was ready for more drastic action. A strong




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minority in the Soviet team argued, on the other hand, that the outside-Germany strike was not a signal of US intent to attack the Soviet Union and that, by carefully refraining from striking Soviet territory, the United States was demonstrating a desire to keep the conflict localized in Europe. They reasoned that if the United States intended to attack the Soviet Union, it would have done so already.

Thus, the assessment of the US team agreed with that of the minority of the Soviet team -- that the situation would not impel the Soviets to attack the United States. The final outcome is a cogent demonstration of how swiftly nuclear escalation, abetted by cumulative errors in reading the opponent's mind, can lead to catastrophe.

The European phase of BETA II was a striking case of victory, going to the weaker side, through bold and thoroughly planned action. The Soviet team realized that its strategy was very far out and expected to lose if the US team responded vigorously.



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
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BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: These games reaffirmed the fact, to me, that our strength overseas, both militarily and politically, stems only from the strength we have at home. Therefore, we must maintain superiority over the communists in our offensive weapons and we must have an adequate anti-ballistic missile weapon system deployed. If our country ever permitted itself to fall into a situation, as developed in the BETA I game, in which I was a member of the Blue team, we are surely asking for a disaster.


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Insofar as the game itself and for future wargaming of this type, I believe that more intelligence should be given by Control. It became obvious to all of us that many of the actions that we took were based on no intelligence. I believe that some intelligence would have been available to both the Blue and Red teams which would have permitted us to take quite different actions than some of those which we found we had to take and that those actions would have averted the nuclear exchange which ended the exercise.



RED I TEAM MEMBER: One of the key factors in the decisions taken by Red I was: what constitutes strategic warning of Blue's willingness to escalate to the point of intercontinental nuclear strike?



I believe this point is worth deeper exploration than was feasible at the Critique.


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BLUE II TEAM MEMBER: BETA II proved rather unexpectedly stimulating, probably because the participants were well informed and gave the issues serious and enlightened consideration.

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
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There are, undoubtedly, many practical limitations affecting the playing of this sort of game. At the risk of underestimating them, may I suggest that longer consideration of initial moves would produce a more useful result. Should the allocation of two days for the first move, with only two moves to the game or should, somehow, circumscribing the first moves so that, in effect, the first two moves would be equivalent to BETA II's first move, be feasible, then increased familiarity with game procedures and more time to formulate positions might be conducive to deeper insights.




Finally, I thought that the introduction of China, into the problem, led to a trivial third phase that provided little enlightenment on the grave issue of the effect of ABM systems on national strategy.

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


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
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The games, also, impressed me with the fact that, once nuclear action was started, even on a low key, it would be very difficult to control or to prevent rapid escalation of the use of more nuclear weapons.




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
I believe the team captain should be specifically instructed not to reflect his own feelings and interpretations into messages to Control. His doing so might result in a tendency to distort consensus.

At times, Control appeared to abandon all plausibility for dramatic impact value, which tends to distract from overall "realism" desired during game play.




P.S. If one postulates the likelihood that our national leadership would act in a crisis much as did the Blue teams in this game, then heaven or somebody else help us should such a day ever arrive!

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


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


Recommend that the Joint War Games Agency prepare intelligence production requirements on the following four sets of information, modified to fit the specific needs of JWGA:

The first is: what happens when ABM systems are deployed?



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CONTROL DIRECTORATE MEMBER: Red I was playing chess based on strategic superiority. Blue I, however, was playing



"chicken". As a result, Red I's chess strategy was stalemated, but in the process Blue lost the game of "chicken".




In retrospect, the scenario and the play of the game did not successfully isolate and test the significance of ABMs, although it came close in BETA II. It did appear that the ABM situation was an important factor in terms of the overall strategic balance, but the over-all strategic balance was not always the determining factor, especially in Blue I's calculations.




I wondered if Blue I would have been less aggressive if Red I had been more aggressive or whether the personalities of the Blue team had greater influence than the game "facts of life".

\* \* \* \* \*




Is such a lag in adjusting policies to capabilities likely to result in the real world? To what extent was it a product of the fact that the game was played in 1967 and the players did not adjust their thinking to the 1972 situation? To what extent are strategies of desperation likely to result from an inferior strategic position in the real world?



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was using the minimum force necessary to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. To some extent, Red I misinterpreted Blue's moves as more aggressive than they were intended to be. Was there anything Blue I might have done to make their intentions clearer to Red I and avoid the escalation which ensued? Was it realistic for Blue I to assume that they could achieve a better bargaining position, given their inferior strategic situation? To what extent did Blue's efforts to achieve a better bargaining position convince Red I that Blue I was acting irrationally? Was there any way in which Blue I could have corrected this interpretation?

It is interesting to note that there was some difference of view on the Blue I team as to the role of tactical nuclear weapons in this confrontation.



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
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RED I TEAM MEMBER: The BETA I-67 game was both interesting and valuable. The caliber of the team members was very high and not the least of the benefits was meeting and working with people from other agencies. Following are a few of the specific points brought out in the debriefing session which may not have received enough emphasis:

The Red I team was constantly surprised by what we considered desperate moves by Blue I.


In the debriefing, the Red I team was characterized as taking vigorous and bold military risks; yet, in the Red discussions we felt that our moves were, if anything, somewhat tame. The constant objective was to play down the crisis and prevent escalation. The Red team set rather limited objectives which, in retrospect, may still have been too high.

One of the objectives of the Red actions was to attempt to preserve the industrial base in Europe in the event that a full scale nuclear exchange occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. This may have tempered the reaction to the large scale use of tactical nuclear weapons.







The problem of a pre-emptive attack, as the Red team saw it, amounted to this: If Red pre-empted, it was certainly in a better position and, in fact, taking the outside range of the casualties quoted, could be possibly in a fair shape. If Red waited until Blue struck first, there was no way to prevent very high casualty levels in Red territory. Little or no consideration was given to the level of the Blue casualties other than that they would be large. This is an interesting point since Red was thinking only of their own skins and not of the differential casualties.



\* \* \* \* \*

RED I TEAM MEMBER: The space treaty does not present any legal barrier to the use, by the Soviets, of non-nuclear weapons or other measures against space devices which they (the Soviets) construe as offensive. This would apply, particularly, to the use of non-nuclear means for disabling reconnaissance satellites over Soviet territory. Several NIE's have addressed this problem.





\* \* \* \* \*

RED I TEAM OBSERVER: It would be helpful if a map were included in the scenario projections any time a geographic point or name is used. The scenarios, when read in offices and away from the JWGA wall maps, need the map references to complete the story. Reference is made to the types of maps included in the [REDACTED]


I don't consider that enough attention, in the game or real life, is paid to the inherent dangers posed by "scavenger" nations. Even though they can only become effective in a disastrous post nuclear war environment, their danger must be recognized as a potent element in the prehostility negotiations between the major participants. From a long range standpoint, the reconstitution and the resultant viability of the United States can be adversely affected by these actions unless provisions are maintained to counter them.

The potential power postures of Southern Hemisphere nations is another area which seems to be quite often neglected; for

instance, Australia with its expanding economy and strategic geographical position. It is realized that, in the time available, the entire world can't be played but the various facets can be considered for different games.

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
RED I TEAM MEMBER: The Red I team perspective indicated that the BETA I game should alert us to the dangers actually inherent in the Berlin situation.



The ABM played a very small role in Red's actions, although its existence, perhaps, led some of us to underestimate the


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extent the Blue team was willing to push hostilities to a very high level. It seems doubtful that the Red team would have acted any differently had Red not possessed an ABM.



The game, perhaps in reasonable simulation of how decisions are actually made, was carried forward on a high level of abstraction. For this reason and the euphemistic nature of statistics, which we all tended to use to describe the effects of various military actions, the true (high fatality) consequences of decisions (especially those involving the use of nuclear weapons) were never fully confronted.

It is sobering and disturbing to realize that a handful of men, in the United States and Soviet Union, can decide the fate of hundreds of millions, including many not in either country.




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BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: It appeared very difficult for the seniors to orient to the game scenario in the short time during which they played. All players, naturally, approached the game, each day, from a "real world" environment, which tempers interpretation of the scenario. I suggest a longer period be allocated for the first move in such games. Perhaps, by carrying over action play to the morning of a second day and asking

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seniors to be present for a 50% longer period on the first day, the adaptation to the scenario will be facilitated.



In BETA I, there seemed to be an indication that the US strategic problems stemmed more from the Soviet BMD than from the combination of increased Soviet ICBMs and lack of a US BMD. I suggest the latter factor is, at least, as important.

I enjoyed the opportunity to participate and I believe that I will continue to profit from the experience.

\* \* \* \* \*

BLUE II ALTERNATE TEAM MEMBER: The results of BETA II imply that a "non-zero sum" game solution to conflict was achieved -- that is, both sides "won" (avoided nuclear war) by cooperation, although each might have been able to do better had it pushed harder and risked the big loss.



The game mechanism could, perhaps, be improved by attempts to better simulate each side's decision-making processes, as contrasted with better simulations of the scenarios, which

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always profit from improvement, of course. In particular, the following techniques would have made me feel that the decision-making process was more "real" and, therefore, more meaningful:

a. Assigning "roles" to members of each side; for example, the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State and Defense, etc. This might involve establishing role relationships between senior and staff players as well.

b. Allowing a larger and more flexible utilization of time; for example, more total time in discussions but broken down into smaller segments more closely spaced.

\* \* \* \* \*

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: The entire BETA exercise provided one of the most intellectually stimulating periods I have witnessed. It is remarkable that this participation and personal motivation could be induced in such a diverse group of players.

B5 I am recommending that as many action officers as possible, in [redacted] take advantage of the TV presentation, when it is available, and see for themselves how the best laid military plans can go differently than one anticipates.

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In BETA I, the use of nuclear weapons was in distinct phases and levels of intensity, [redacted]




The play of BETA I highlighted several areas of great importance to the United States in the maintenance of its military and political posture in Europe.




BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: In BETA I, the Blue team had as an objective, the negotiation of a new status for Berlin and, if possible, the negotiation of a settlement to the entire German problem.





Had the Blue team assessed, more carefully, its bargaining assets, the opportunity for a favorable negotiated German settlement, as well as the hazards of a bold military response, it is quite probable that a settlement could have been reached, which would have been acceptable to the German people, while removing the responsibility of the United States to maintain an indefensible posture in Berlin.

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The following are some discussions that took place during the Red II deliberations:

a. In the first move, the Red team questioned whether the strategic advantage enjoyed by Blue II would restrict options available to the Kremlin. It was decided that the issue, West German nuclear weapons, was a popular cause and that the US decision-making process was cumbersome.


b. Seniors of Red II questioned the efficacy of iron bombing West German nuclear facilities after the imposition of the Berlin blockade. They gave the move their benediction when it was pointed out that failure to do this would signal that the Soviet Union was willing to trade a West German nuclear program for West Berlin.

c. Discussion arose, during the first move, as to which side was more prepared to accept casualties; the Soviets, because of


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their conditioning by history -- famine, purges and WW II -- or the United States because it doesn't know what it is to see its women and children killed. No agreement was reached.


d. In the second move, the Red team saw the opportunity to hold Europe hostage even though the United States held a decided edge.



e. In the third move, there was considerable debate over a Soviet act against their fellow communist state, China. Some players felt that the Soviet Union should invade Sinkiang. Others advocated an ambiguous nuclear strike against the CHICOM nuclear facilities. The majority held, however, that the Soviets could not afford to move overtly against another communist nation unless threatened directly by that nation.



g. Other debates among the Red II players addressed matters of timing and the wording of notes. Some clever ideas fell out of these discussions, such as the civilian blockade of Berlin and the 24 hour delay in complaining to the United States if it mounted a nuclear attack against the Chinese ICBM sites.



[REDACTED]

In the second move, the Red II team saw the opportunity to hold Europe hostage even though the United States enjoyed a marked strategic advantage. They felt lack of a NATO ABM system left Europe almost completely vulnerable to MRBMs. Can the United States keep alliances alive without providing ABM umbrellas to its partners? The same sort of thing came to the fore during the excursion. The Blue team had to reckon with the possibility of the Chinese striking an ally; e.g., Japan.

[REDACTED]

There exists a strong "oh, they wouldn't do that" feeling, between the United States and the Soviet Union, while the possibility of war by miscalculation is very real. In fact, many Soviets would suggest that a full thermonuclear war could not only fall out of "miscalculations" but also of escalation. Some Soviets consider "limited nuclear war" to be a fantasy. Proof that this sort of thing permeates Soviet military planning is found in the fact that the Soviets have only recently begun developing nuclear weapons in small packages.

It is worthy of note that the Red II team planned the use of chemical and biological weapons, in the second move, when they faced such drastic strategic disadvantages. They planned to deliver C&B weapons via agents as a dying gasp in the face of nuclear destruction. Perhaps this sort of doomsday technique is not inconsistent with the Soviet mentality.

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BETA I & II-67

SENIOR CRITIQUE

The following comments are extracts from the transcript of the Senior Critique of BETA I & II-67:

\* \* \* \* \*

[REDACTED] Mr. Secretary, Gentlemen, unfortunately we just received word that [REDACTED] has been called to the White House. Unless he makes it late, we'll have to do without the Chairman this afternoon.

I want to welcome you to the Critique of BETA I & II. The interest and cooperation that we've had from all of your agencies, in preparation for the game, was certainly very much appreciated. The high-level of attendance and the high-spirited play we had during the course of the game should give us many interesting, thought-provoking questions to discuss here this afternoon. Before we start, I want to remind you the principle purpose of the game was consultative, to illuminate some of the major issues and problems, and to raise questions for us to delve into later. As usual, we hope that some new insights have been gained and that better perspectives have been suggested to the players. Without anything further, I'll turn it over to [REDACTED] for a few preliminary remarks before we turn it over to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gentlemen, in defense of the initial scenarios that provided the springboard for the exercises, I think we should say that basically it was an attempt to play a politico-military game and to examine subjects related to the ABM question in a political-military context. From the very beginning, we had no idea of playing a technological kind of game or doing the sort of thing that one does with operations analysis, or with war games, and I think this is an important distinction that we finally came fully to grips with in about the middle of the second move. In BETA I, the United States did not have an ABM system and the Soviets did. In BETA II, we sought to convey the idea that the United States had a strategic advantage, including an effective ABM system. While it might have been very nice if we could have had similar situations in both the games and only altered one

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
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or two parameters -- perhaps the ABM -- we were not playing the operations research kind of game to arrive at definitive conclusions or specific answers. So, we played basically two different worlds.

The BETA I world and the BETA II world were drastically different and we hoped, thereby, to encompass as much peripheral material and related subject matter as we could. We initially established a situation of parity, except for the ABM in BETA I. We gave the United States a very marked strategic superiority in BETA II. However, in the very first Control projection, to keep the game from turning into a war game -- (it was beginning to look a little bit that way, with the concentration on weapon options, mixes and hardening detail) -- Control provided each team with some firm assumptions on comparative first strike casualty figures. These gave the US an inferior strategic situation in BETA I including the lack of an ABM and it gave the United States a definitely superior situation in BETA II, including a highly effective ABM.

To head off detailed discussion here, of the military deployments behind those figures, it should be understood that they were only intended to represent the view the teams supposedly had of their own and of their opponent's posture. This was intended, and I think it was accepted as sort of a shorthand way, by the various participants -- however, lacking in realism -- to describe the relative strategic positions. The figures were not produced on the basis of a systems analysis although they were intended to represent the results of that kind of analysis.

Gentlemen, the security classification of the discussion this afternoon may not exceed TOP SECRET. The game was played at the SECRET level. There are TV cameras recording the discussion. Everything that is recorded will, of course, be transcribed without attribution and nothing that is said in the room will go outside with respect to anybody's opinion or position.

 Thank you very much  Gentlemen, I'd like to begin our critique this afternoon with very brief summaries of the two games. I think this will facilitate the understanding of those who played on BETA I of what the BETA II scenario involved and vice versa; this should help our subsequent discussion.

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Before having these briefings, however, I would like to make one or two general introductory remarks. In this connection, may I first thank our distinguished group of consultants who participated on Control and on each of the teams,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, [REDACTED] played a very active and constructive role in the game but, unfortunately, he is not able to be with us here today; he's in [REDACTED] filling certain commitments that he had previously undertaken.

Secondly, as a general comment let me, if I may, say a word or two about Control's involvement in the game. Traditionally, Control is sort of fair game for all players -- my own participation on action teams, in the past, has certainly suggested this to me. I would say, however, in defense of the participation which Control attempted to inject into the game that we did, wherever we could, attempt to reserve our involvement and to limit the degree of manipulation in advancing the scenario. We, of course, did play third countries, a hand of fate, world opinion, etc., and though you may not have always recognized this to be the case, when you looked at the results of our handiwork, we really attempted to restrain ourselves -- to lean over backwards, not to pre-empt play of the game. Nevertheless, I'm sure you'll appreciate that in meshing the wide variety of considerations which the teams brought to bear, we had to decide, in certain circumstances, how you would have responded to situations where perhaps you gave us only general guidelines, or we otherwise had to inject aspects which were designed to keep the teams focused on the central consideration, namely the effect of the positive strategic balance, rather than permitting a drift to other important though relatively less central issues.

In this connection, for example, when the BETA II game seemed to focus more attention of both the Red and Blue teams on the issue of German desire for a national nuclear capability, rather than on the US/USSR confrontation, we took the liberty of injecting the Asian excursion. We feel this was very profitable and we only regret that there was not more of an opportunity to have several moves on that game and to equip you with a Red Chinese team which could have played the game rather than Control.

In any event, I must say that we all felt that all of the seniors took these interjections on our part in the spirit that they were intended, that is, as stimulants to the gaming of the strategic balance. We, of Control, are very grateful for your forbearance. Now, without more delay, I would like to ask for our two summary briefings. [REDACTED] I believe you have the first one.

Summary of BETA I: See page A-2.

Summary of BETA II: See page A-8.

[REDACTED] Gentlemen, with your permission, I would like to identify what we on Control thought were some of the more significant issues which were raised in the BETA I game. I hope you will address these, but I urge that you by no means limit yourself to consideration of the questions that we raise. Please raise whatever issues you deem to be of particular significance. I do suggest, however, as a means for proceeding in an orderly fashion, that we attempt to limit ourselves initially to the issues which are relevant to BETA I and then we will follow this by considering the issues relevant to BETA II. Let me then turn to the BETA I game.

The object of our game was to assess the effect of a given strategic balance on the teams' response in a particular political-military crisis situation and, more specifically, to assess the effect -- to the extent that this was possible -- of an ABM deployment in these circumstances. BETA I, I think, raises some interesting questions in the foregoing connection.

[REDACTED]

I think it would be interesting to hear our senior players comment with regard to some of the following questions: First of all, what implications can be drawn from the Blue team's

[REDACTED]

political loss of Europe -- in those circumstances, are desperate means, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, more likely to be resorted to?

Secondly, to what extent did the Blue team concern itself with the probabilities of, and consequences of, escalation before using its tactical nuclear weapons?

Thirdly, with regard to the Red team, to what extent was it influenced in its willingness to take very vigorous and bold actions by its possession of a significant strategic advantage? Further, how were the two teams influenced by the absolute casualties they would suffer in a strategic exchange as contrasted to the relative damage they and their adversaries would have to accept? In other words, which weighed most heavily in your thinking in your decision-process: The absolute damage to the enemy, to yourselves, or the relative balance between the two? In this latter connection, to what extent would a nuclear offensive capability, which appeared able to negate the Soviet ABMs, have been as useful to Blue as its own ABM system?

I think this is one series of questions I'd like to come back to in just a moment. There is another area somewhat related.

This obviously raises a number of very interesting questions. To what extent, for example, did Blue and Red consider the political implications of even a successful tactical nuclear war in the center of Europe? Did they, for example, expect continued allied support? And would lack of such support have made a difference to either of the two teams? Was the choice by Blue, that is, a logical outcome of a position of strategic inferiority? Could it also logically occur in a position of strategic parity?

[REDACTED]

For example, did this imply a judgment on Blue's part that Red would not reply in kind; or alternatively, if Red were to reply in kind, how did Blue feel that its negotiating position would have been improved? In any event, it would be interesting to hear some comments as to the advantages which the Blue team felt an improved negotiating position might have derived for them in terms of the risks which they were prepared to accept.

Now finally and very briefly, let me say that after the initial moves, when it was disclosed that Red enjoyed a significant strategic advantage, Blue discussed the possibility of a limited strike against the radars associated with the Soviet ABM capabilities; the so-called "Operation Fox". This idea was eventually put aside; however,

[REDACTED]

As for the Red team, it anticipated the [REDACTED]

In response to the actual contingency which it faced -- namely, [REDACTED] -- the Red team did choose to employ a strategic attack against the United States. Now, again, I think there are a number of interesting questions. I wonder, for example, how the Red and Blue players assessed the importance of a nuclear attack which was on the home territory of one of the major disputants. Similarly, why did the Red team place such great significance on [REDACTED]


I think this is, perhaps, sufficient to indicate the wide range of questions which the game seemed to us to illustrate.

I wonder, now, if we might return to the initial question -- namely, that which revolved around the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons by Blue against the background of a strategic balance which very sharply favored the Red team. I wonder if we can have some comments on this question? I would just suggest that the Captain of the Blue Action Team might want to address himself to this.


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BLUE I: I can obviously speak only for myself which may well have been the case even during the game. I won't succumb to the temptation to fight this scenario and particularly the last move which some of us have grave doubts about; but for the sake of argument, and for the sake of discussing what did happen, I will stick to what happened in the game.

We understood clearly that the main purpose of this exercise was to push a simulated United States team to the wall to see what might happen in a world of shrinking options for the United States. I guess we gracefully fell into the hole that had been dug for us.




As a result of our estimate of the problem, we took a firm stand that reflected, first of all, the very American view of the moral nature of a political commitment and this permeated our entire position -- up to the point when we were about to abandon it -- I might add.



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
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I would finish by expressing my own view that President Kennedy, the day after the Cuban missile crisis, was heard to say that there might be other situations where the Soviets were not likely to back down -- where they had tactical superiority, where they felt they were right, and where the United States was not in a position to prevail.




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Thank you very much. I'd like to hear from other members of the Blue team. Before we do this \_\_\_\_\_, you might want to just comment briefly on this point.

RED I: It's quite obvious to everyone that Red held most of the good cards in this game. I don't think that, in light of this situation, as structured, that the Reds behaved with any particular aggressiveness. On the contrary, I would make this point -- it was sort of necessary, as we went along, to constrain ourselves from really taking more ambitious bites than we actually did in light of the kind of situation in which we found ourselves -- which, if a good simulacrum upon reality, might give all of us a good cause for reflection.

I suppose the basic element, that underlay our position throughout, was the feeling that the \_\_\_\_\_



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The second consideration was that we had little discussion about the irrational element in decision-making. I think we all felt that, on a rational calculus, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We were also aware that she had a great deal of prestige and position and much at stake and that she might act in a somewhat desperate way. I think that was one of the considerations that led us to kind of ease off from time to time.

Now, the obvious question is -- is this the behavior of Americans or is this good simulated Soviet behavior? I find it rather difficult to give a good answer to this question. I think that it's perhaps one of the most important questions that arise out of games like this and it underscores what, for me, is a lacuna in our knowledge. How does this Soviet decision-making process work and how, in circumstances like this, are the Soviets apt to respond? Every once in awhile, we had to ask ourselves, once we had made a decision, "Is that a Soviet decision or is that an American decision?"

That is the thing that is left with me after this game and I think, in my previous game experience, is probably the most important thing that has come through -- this necessity for us to somehow or other find a better way to get a handle on, not only the machinery of Soviet decision-making, but the spirit of it as well.

[REDACTED] Thank you. I must say one of the interesting facts that impressed itself upon me, which seems to have emerged from the game and from this immediate exchange here, is this. [REDACTED]

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In fact, in this game, the ultimate consequences of the Blue action was apparently to persuade the Reds that they ought to exercise their strategic option somewhat sooner than might otherwise have been the case. I wonder if we can hear from other members of the Blue team on this aspect? I know that you had a number of interesting observations during the time I sat in your group. I wonder if you'd like to comment?

BLUE I: Well, I might discount some of the comments that were made by our Chairman because I'm not sure that we went through all of the thought-process with which he credited us. (LAUGHTER) I must say that I didn't attend the first meeting. In looking at the scenario for the second, I almost didn't attend that either (LAUGHTER) because I think we found ourselves in a situation where we had a loss. The question was "what kind of loss?"

As far as my own thinking was concerned, I just had to refer back to the mission that had been given us. In the scenario it's very simply stated by the President that "the United States should take whatever action required to free Berlin and its access routes and to establish stability in Central Europe".

[REDACTED] It put us, from the point of view of domestic psychology, in an almost impossible position with the type of reaction that you get from the United States public when some element of the US [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Would you care to comment on the extent to which your group explicitly focused on the probabilities of escalation and the extent to which this figured in your decision-making process? Perhaps your associates might want to join you.


BLUE I: Well, it just happens that I hold the view that, in the employment of this particular type of weapon, unless somebody is sitting with a radiac meter, he's not going to know whether you had the tremendous wallop of a bomb -- and not a very large one at that -- or a Davy Crockett. The characteristics of the Davy Crockett are such that there is some difficulty in distinguishing as to the particular type of detonation that's taking place.



\_\_\_\_\_, did you want to comment on this?

BLUE I: \_\_\_\_\_ said, he didn't know whether the decision, the Red team took, was an American or Soviet decision. I think on our side, I don't know whether it's an American decision or a Blue decision. I have a hunch that if the 90-minute period we had, had been either 30 minutes longer, or 15 minutes shorter, we might have done something very differently. (LAUGHTER) I was almost persuaded by \_\_\_\_\_ to accept the diplomatic wisdom and prudence of a military man to take our losses and spend 10 years recovering the position, that had slipped away from us, by patience.






Thank you \_\_\_\_\_.

BLUE I: I think there's a scenario paradox, actually, because in the \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ This was discussed perhaps more than any other single point.

\_\_\_\_\_ Let me comment on that \_\_\_\_\_. It somewhat surprised Control as well. I think it should be quite clear

that this was an action which the Red team itself chose. They exclusively chose to inject their forces in the path of an anticipated Blue advance. One wonders whether that sort of action was related, at least in part, to a feeling of confidence that they had such an enormous strategic advantage that they could take very grave risks, feeling that the Blue team would have to back down. I just wanted to make it very clear that it was not a Control injection. I wonder if we can now ask the members of the Red team if they would like to comment on a number of these points?





something that perhaps you discussed. This was the idea of cutting your losses, drawing back at the line, not attempting to fight it out in East Germany and getting to work building up, for the next five or ten years, a massive strategic strength which we in Red would not have had the resources to keep pace with and match.

Obviously, any game can't be played in all of the various alternative ways, but it would have been interesting, I think, to see how that kind of situation would have developed. Similarly, we had set as one of our objectives on keeping the United States from building up its strategic forces for a period of years and I don't think that our strategy, assuming it had stopped short of general war, really provided any effective way of helping to bring that particular objective around.

[REDACTED] Thank you very much \_\_\_\_\_, [REDACTED] \_\_\_\_\_.

RED I: I'd like to make two comments; one which is partly a comment on \_\_\_\_\_'s point, and one which is a question imposed originally. Were our actions motivated by our losses, relative losses, US losses, or what?

[REDACTED]

Thank you very much for those interesting comments. I wonder if we could ask for a clarification on one point. The Blue team members have commented, \_\_\_\_\_, I think, specifically, that the moves or the options which seemed opened to Blue were pretty darn unattractive under the best of circumstances and the use of nuclear weapons seemed an option. They've also maintained, however, that this action was taken in part to improve a negotiating posture and position. These two are not by any means necessarily inconsistent, but at the same time, they're not necessarily the same either. I wonder if perhaps, \_\_\_\_\_, you might be willing to comment a little bit on the rationale or logic of the use of nuclear weapons in that sort of a situation, as it relates to the negotiating posture, as you saw it?

BLUE I: Well, I don't know that I'm in a good position to comment on this because I tended to be in the minority all the way through. (LAUGHTER).


BLUE I: We adopted all your positions. (LAUGHTER).

BLUE I: Except for one. First, I was a "dove" and then I was a "hawk" in the sense that I was very dubious about going into the nuclear field with the deck stacked against us as it was. You didn't give us any negotiating position to start with, it's true, but you gave us a reasonable amount of security.

[REDACTED]


In phase one, our diplomatic position was awfully stacked against us, but the option of going down the nuclear field seemed to be going into a field where the deck was stacked even more against us and, in fact, this is the way it turned out.

[REDACTED]



Those were interesting remarks. I wonder if we can get just a little further clarification on one of the points that you made, mainly with regard to "Operation Fox." Here, you mentioned that you were going to get on the hot-line. I think there is an interesting question as to how effective the words of the Blue team would have been -- what impression would have made upon Kremlin leadership, as contrasted to the

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


I wonder if we can get some exchange between the Red and Blue members? \_\_\_\_\_?





[REDACTED] I wonder if you would just like to briefly comment on the logic of the Red team's willingness to react with pre-emption to a potential attack against the HEN HOUSES?



BLUE I: As you said earlier, that even without the ABM superiority, we would have made the same decisions.

RED I: It was not because of the actual change of balance that would have been effected but what it would have seemed, in that case, to suggest as to Blue's intent. The fact that Blue was willing to take the risk involved in going at something that was so vital and critical, in this sense, seemed like perhaps the one limited move which might have implied intent to escalate to a strategic exchange.

[REDACTED] Gentlemen, as much as I would like to permit this part of the conversation to continue, we really ought to turn to BETA II.


BLUE I: Let me ask you one question about the game. Did anybody ever consider making these contingency plans available to the other side? e.g., "If you do this to me, I'll do that to you."

[REDACTED] Not as far as Control was concerned. There was, I think at one point, a suggestive leakage but it didn't materialize.

RED I: May I say about a minute and a half worth?

I think there were a couple of significant points on our side that have not been mentioned. First and foremost on


"Operation Fox", \_\_\_\_\_ said he spent maybe three minutes discussing. I think that there was a much higher majority, as to our reaction on this, than there was on the pre-emption. The reasons being, principally, that this would be an attack on Russian territory and that this would redress the principal element of our strategic superiority -- so, we had practically no argument on our actions. I don't quite understand how a "hot-line" would change that decision much either.



Thank you.


BLUE I: May I make one more comment on this?


\_\_\_\_\_ I'm going to have to ask that this be the last comment, however, on this game.



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Whereas, you had one team who would assess this as being significant and of very supreme importance, the other tended, in a way, to downgrade it completely. The other comment, I think, that comes out of the game and is very important, is the whole question of communication between teams. I think a lot of what happened, really would have been avoided, and the whole situation would have been resolved to both sides favor or a better solution than we had, if communication between the two sides had been improved.

 Thank you very much. I'm sure we share a common frustration of not being able to go on further. There are certainly a number of very interesting areas we haven't touched on in the BETA I game. Let me, however, dive into the BETA II game and raise what, perhaps, was the central message that came across to Control and ask for some reactions to it.



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BLUE II: I think when we actually got up against it, we had time to consider it more carefully than we had in the second move. In the second move, we were playing essentially a European game and merely looking over our shoulders at the Far East. We did consider a lot more carefully in the third move.

\_\_\_\_\_?

BLUE II: At least on that round.

Do you want to comment further on that line?

In fact, there was a fairly extensive discussion in your group with a suggestion that a pre-emptive attack be made. Was there not?

BLUE II: There was. There was complete disarray within the group on what to do. I think we had one vote for each. We had six players and six different arguments.

\_\_\_\_\_ I don't know whether anybody who played on that game would like to speak on the motivation which suggested that

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a pre-emptive attack should be made. I'm sorry that \_\_\_\_\_ isn't here. I know that he participated in this discussion.

BLUE II: He was fierce!


BLUE II: [REDACTED]


3-5 [REDACTED] There was one part in the scenario of BETA II that did not impress me. I think the Russians are not bad politicians. My contact with them has impressed me that they have a pretty good understanding of human nature. In other words, in 1972, we were behind them, technically speaking, and by 1974 we might catch up.

3-5 [REDACTED] I would be inclined to say, let's wait a minute. China might be drawing even with us in ten years, but what kind of change would occur in the Chinese political system? What kind of change would come about? This was the one place that bothered me. It's possibly not completely representative, but I think a bit representative of the attitude of the people who would be occupying the White House in the next decade or so.



BLUE II: Each time we do something we get more committed and, therefore, are willing to stand more risk. The argument in the game wasn't: "Should we limit how far we are going to go if everything up to that point is unsuccessful?" The argument was: "How far do we go in the first step?" Mr. \_\_\_\_\_'s first step was really, in effect, more peaceful than anybody else proposed. He was going to send a message. The question was, what do we do with it at the next point? Some of us argued that we should go with it step-by-step. We have enough offense, with or without a defense, so it just doesn't make any sense for the Chinese to attack Los Angeles because their attack in Korea has stalled. I don't think any of us have any doubts that, if at any one step things didn't work after waiting awhile, we would just go on to the next step. Maybe we didn't make it as clear as we might have, but we wanted Control to make this clear to the Chinese; but there wasn't a Chinese team which, of course, affected it.

 Let me just carry this one step further but in a somewhat opposite direction and along the long line of Mr. \_\_\_\_\_'s comment.



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[REDACTED]

I know there was some discussion in your team on this, Mr. \_\_\_\_\_.

[REDACTED]

BLUE II: You posed two questions; i.e., there might have been a conventional response, but it wouldn't have gone as far as fighting the whole war with conventional weapons.

[REDACTED] I recognize that distinctly, Mr. \_\_\_\_\_.

CONTROL: I must say the teams really outstripped the expectations of Control because we surely felt that, if we did give them a conventional alternative, in this case they'd use it and that's the reason we made clear that it was not available. I think that it's apparent to everyone that the games can only test a very little bit, but there are many choices of context that you could select which would be relevant and I think the game is successful if we just end up with more questions than we started with. I suspect that this game is already marked by its success just in this way.

[REDACTED]

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We didn't have to have games, presumably, in order to see where they would come out. With the growth of the Soviet strategic forces, the current high-level of their offensive missile deployment, and their initiation of an ABM, I would say that it clearly behooves us to analyze the possible political-military effects of a relatively lessened US superiority.

In the same vein, this is our first attempt to consider the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability against the continental United States and it is perfectly apparent that not very much can be derived, with any certainty, from a game which, essentially, was limited to one move in this regard. I do think, however, that the importance of the Chinese development clearly warrants further examination in subsequent games. I trust that we can look to [redacted] (and his staff for further examination of a number of points which you raised, and which obviously remain to be raised, but which we were unfortunately not able to get to. Thank you very much. [redacted]

[redacted] Thank you. I'd like to leave with a couple of notes of caution. One, of course, is quite obvious. There were serious enough miscalculations on the part of both sides, as to the intent of the other, while reading from practically the same scenario; thus, when you crank the true Russian team into it and different scenarios, I'm sure that you have a real problem. These games are somewhat similar to a poker game, perhaps, when you relate them to real life -- the difference between table stakes and no-limit poker! I think we all understand the problems in the inference of that situation.

We have not explored many of the problems that the Director mentioned at the start of the meeting. We will attempt, in the [redacted] to highlight the problems which we have missed, as well as those that we have discussed here. We will give a great deal of study to them and present them in the Final Report and, also, in the film summaries that will be made. We expect these to be ready for viewing the latter part of June or July. We'll invite senior officials from your agencies to see these summaries, sometime in that time period.

In the absence of [redacted] I'd like to express my appreciation to [redacted] to all of the participants in the game, and particularly to the consultants that came in from out of town and, finally, to the [redacted] who participated throughout the game. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

BETA I & II-67

ACTION-LEVEL CRITIQUE

The following comments are extracts from the transcript of the Action-level Critique of BETA I & II-67.

\* \* \* \* \*


[REDACTED] I wonder if we can turn to the question of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I wonder if we may have some comments on this question just to kick it off? Perhaps the Captain of the Blue action-level team would like to give us the insights that he gained?

BLUE I: This is a form of Divine retribution for me because I've always managed to stay off teams and run Control Groups, thus doing everything I could to make life agonizing for American teams to see how far they could be pushed and how much we could make them sweat. For years I've tried, in my games, to force the teams over the brink to nuclear war but never succeeded and, I think, this is the first time the [REDACTED] has succeeded. The teams would never resort to nuclear war unless forced to do so and I think I now see very clearly why. How you got us to do it is another problem which I shall now address, however, I don't feel very defensive about the way we became involved in a nuclear war. I think what you really want is a mood of self-criticism, particularly since our team was rather sharply divided. I don't know whether this can be said during the Senior Critique this afternoon, but I'm certainly going to say it this morning. (LAUGHTER). The Blue team wasn't divided vertically; it was divided horizontally. Maybe you can advise me how to handle that statement this afternoon.

Now, without fighting the scenario or fighting Control, I guess the only technical question about the game, before I make any further comments, is: "Would the Soviet team have indeed pre-empted if they had been permitted to make a fourth move, so to speak, instead of having Control make it for them?" I'm not sure that question is worth too much discussion. We should assume that the Soviet team would have pre-empted, otherwise there's nothing to discuss -- Blue would have won. Assuming that Red would have pre-empted anyway, then, let me address myself briefly, and others can comment, as to what happened in fact.

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
Yes, you will! (LAUGHTER).

I don't think we were wrong because, rationally, the Soviets took a completely different view of the situation. I

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think our strategy failed because both sides mis-perceived or misunderstood the nature of the particular moves that eventually triggered escalation; and that both sides misread and, at the margins -- not centrally, but just at the margins -- the signals that each was making. Finally, the Soviets found themselves locked into a preplanned launch on warning, as it were, that I quarreled with a moment ago.




I then went back and read what President John F. Kennedy had said the day after the Cuban missile crisis ended: "He was afraid that people would conclude, from this experience, that all we had to do in dealing with the Russians was to be tough and they would collapse"; but he pointed out that: "The Cuban missile crisis took place in an area where we enjoyed local superiority. Soviet national security was not engaged. The Soviets lacked a plausible case, et cetera. Things would be different if the situation were one where the Soviets enjoyed local superiority, where their national security was directly at stake, and where they could convince themselves and others that they were right". Kennedy went on to say, "when we stood up, they had to back down; but this doesn't mean, at all, that they would back down when they felt they


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were in the right and when their vital interests were involved". I wish we had read that aloud a week ago today. We didn't. We should have listened to Kennedy. We should have adopted the strategy of "reculer pour mieux sauter"; live to, at least, talk another day.

Perhaps I'll stop here but I would like to say, at some point before I lose the floor forever, that the United States team did not pay enough attention to the uses of diplomacy. The United States tends to think of negotiations as something you do only when you've beaten the enemy or when you've been beaten. On the contrary, I think we could have used diplomacy here, as an alternative course, and I was very disappointed that we failed to do so and that, in effect, we weren't permitted to use diplomacy.


 Thank you very much for your very provocative comments. I'm sure they will stimulate a number of thoughts but I think we ought to give the other team a crack back at you. Go ahead, Red I.

RED I: I should observe at the beginning that, since I wasn't on hand for the last move, I'm going to have to call on whoever was  during that period, to fill you in on why Red I went to the automatic pre-emptive strategic attack.

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
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


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I think that's interesting. Could you amplify on just one point? You said that you thought the Red team had a general feeling of confidence from its ABM protection, as portrayed in the scenario. Did you discuss that protection as distinct from the overall strategic advantage you were given?



The point made by the Seniors was that we would needlessly

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
One of my colleagues has a comment.

BLUE I: It still could be degraded.


RED I: No,

That isn't really an immediate consequence of logic because it depends on just how much the US missiles were thought to be degraded by the "Reds".







This could be the influence of Control. It is an interesting point; however, you haven't commented on the significance which you attach to the striking of Soviet territory as contrasted to the exchange in the center of Europe. There was a very active debate, as I recall, in the US team as to how much significance this "Operation Fox" would have and how the Red team would react. I'm sorry, but I didn't get any insights as I wasn't able to sit in on both teams simultaneously, but I don't know how you felt. I wonder if we could just have an exchange on the significance of that question?




BLUE I: This is referring to the question of the attack on East Germany.

RED I: I know, but I'm relating that to an attack from, as opposed to the GDR and as opposed to the USSR; strikes in those two cases.





I think that's an important point. Do you want to comment on this?



RED I: I think we also felt that it was very difficult to distinguish a pre-emptive attack from an attack just on our ABMs.


BLUE I: We were going to phone you! (LAUGHTER).




Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, did you want to comment on this?



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


Col \_\_\_\_\_?

You mean within the emergency period as distinguished from the longer term.


BLUE I: No, I mean in the longer term. We saw no advantage in having a war two years later.

 That's interesting because we perceived it exactly the opposite.



I think it should be brought out that there's quite a difference between BETA I and BETA II in this respect.

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RED I: We tended to take the higher ends of the uncertainties as the possible outcome.




RED I: One point, alluded to several times, is that [redacted] Rightly or wrongly, I don't think the team thought we were taking very large risks or very bold and vigorous actions, in kind of a limited objective thing, until the final move.

RED I: I not only think that Blue got mileage out of its bluff but it seemed to me that this was the real reason behind those who argued for the final strike by Red. For three


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
C-40



I hope you'll make your point again, during the Senior Critique, and if you do, I'll promise to make mine again, because this afternoon we'll have some of the Seniors who were deeply involved in the game and to whom I was reporting at the time we were drawing up the Berlin policy.

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
C-42



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 Let me come back to you in one second. There was a related comment from the other side of the room.

BLUE II: I was on the third move and, in some sense, your questions are inseparable. I think I can say something, at least, about the China/ABM question. I would like to introduce a couple of points which, in my mind, made the case. Forgetting about the change between contingency plan versus game reality, it seems to me that the ABM variables were far less important than the group here seems to believe.

  
When the contingency was written, I can make a case that it could have been felt, although I was not there, that if the Chinese were to try that kind of an attack while the United States was embroiled with the Soviet Union, it would mean major stakes from the Chinese point of view and I would like to introduce that as a change.

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[REDACTED] Would you have liked an ABM that was capable of protecting Tokyo then?

BLUE II: Well, before we could answer that question, we'd have to go down the list of other US interests.

[REDACTED] You didn't discuss this with your group though?

[REDACTED] Would anybody else like to comment on this?

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Do you want to comment on that?

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C-45

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] That's a good question. Do you want to take a crack at that?

BLUE II: I can't talk in detail about what someone else has said.

[REDACTED] Well, I think you can put the general question though, individually, without speaking for others. Do you feel that you would have been inhibited in that situation from going to the use of tactical nuclear weapons? I think, in the simplest terms, is the essence of the question.

[REDACTED]

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CONTROL: I'd like to ask the Blue team a few questions. In your contingency move, Move II, what casualties did you really assess the United States would have?

BLUE II: I think this is the answer to both your question and the previous question. It's a little hard to compare Move II and Move III as far as South Korea and the Far East is concerned. In Move II, we were playing Europe and, therefore, in discussing our strategic situation and the ABM, we were really focused on the Soviets and we didn't consider any real probability of a Red Chinese attack on the United States. We may have mentioned that possibility, but it was just in passing. It is very hard, I think, to compare Moves II and III, as far as the Far East was concerned because our interest was focused on an entirely different set of circumstances.





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
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BLUE II: That's quite right.

RED II: I was fascinated at the extent to which the teams had been thinking differently.



 May I ask for some fairly brief responses? We're beginning to run over our allotted time and I don't want to keep you all too much longer, although there are many other interesting questions.



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[REDACTED]

That's interesting. We have time for one more brief question.

[REDACTED]

BLUE II: I don't think there's anybody. (LAUGHTER)

[REDACTED] How many would not have changed their opinion of the undesirability of a pre-emptive attack even if you had a better ABM system?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Some of you, for reasons of the positions of your Agency, find it hard to accept the hypothesis of an effective ABM. I recommend that you think, rather, of an ineffective offense. (LAUGHTER) It turned out to be the same thing in the calculation. Now, the question that's asked is, "if you expect substantially no casualties, no mortalities --"

BLUE II: What do you mean by "substantially no casualties?" In the US, or elsewhere?

[REDACTED] I mean, what Mr. McNamara puts in the posture statement as zero plus.

BLUE II: No. Give me a number!

[REDACTED]

I see different shakings of heads.

BLUE II: I personally would still have made a decision not to pre-empt.

[REDACTED] We're going to be in a position to further explore some of these questions this afternoon with the Seniors. I hope a good number of these same questions will come up for additional discussion. It is perfectly obvious that we can only scratch the surface in the time available to us this morning.

I would like to make one final comment, though, before turning this meeting back to [REDACTED]. I think there was, maybe, some significance to be drawn from the fact that this is the first game, as far as I am aware, in which we have attempted to game the affect of strategic forces and the strategic balance. It seems to me that, in past periods, the overwhelming US strategic superiority has been taken for granted. One of our members here today, as a matter of fact, remarked that he thought perhaps there was a degree of projection of the existence of this US superiority on the part of the Blue team playing in a "72" context where, at least, the scenario had postulated a different situation. In any event, with the growth of Soviet strategic forces and the high-level of the current Soviet offensive build-up and initiation of a Soviet ABM, it seems to me that it surely behooves us to analyze, with whatever techniques are available to us, including these politico-military games, the effect of a relatively lessened US superiority.

In the same vein, I think this was the first attempt to consider the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability, which could reach the United States. We've had previous games where we conceded an MRBM capability to the Chinese, but this is the first time we've ever



tried to look at one where the Continental United States was threatened. While this latter, I think, is still removed in point of time, the importance of the development is also obvious and, I think, warrants further examination, perhaps, in a subsequent game. In any event, I'm sure all of us could submit variables to both games, to those that Control played around with, and perhaps we can have additional games to examine some of these. Now, let me turn this meeting back to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] First, gentlemen, at the risk of running into the problem of definitions, I'd like to pre-empt the Chairman and express his appreciation, as well as my own, for the participation of those people who might not be here this afternoon.

I'd like, also, to say that, obviously, we're going to end up this afternoon with a great number of unanswered and undiscussed questions. Along those lines, I hope that our review of the game and the final video presentation, plus the Final Report, will consider many of these items and I'd like to urge again that all of you take a look at our video presentation; probably in late June or sometime in July. Tom, do you have anything else to add?

[REDACTED] Just a reminder that those pieces of paper in front of you are intended for your use in writing down the other thoughts that remain in your mind right now. I believe we'll put them into the Final Report.

[REDACTED] Thank you all very much.

[REDACTED] Thank you, gentlemen.

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BETA I & II - 67

The BETA - 67 games were prepared and conducted under the supervision of Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, USA, Chief, Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with extensive assistance from many personnel of the participating agencies and commands. The Project Officer was Lt Col Lyle E. Mann, USAF, Member, Politico-Military Branch, CWD.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The following individuals participated in BETA I & II - 67:

Game Directorate

Mr. Seymour Weiss, Director	Director for Combined Policy, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
Dr. Joseph I. Coffey	National Security Studies Manager Bendix Aerospace Systems Division
Dr. Albert J. Wohlstetter	Department of Political Science University of Chicago
Mr. Daniel M. Weiler	The RAND Corporation
Col Robert N. Ginsburgh	Chairman's Staff Group, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Team Captains

Mr. John C. Ausland	State Department Advisor and Special Assistant to J-5
Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield	Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Henry R. Kissinger	Center for International Affairs Harvard University
Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe	The RAND Corporation

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SENIOR PARTICIPANTS

MGen R. B. Allison, USAF . . . . . JCS (CSSG)  
Honorable Joseph W. Barr . . . . . Treasury  
LGen Marshall S. Carter, USA . . . . . NSA  
Mr. Richard T. Davies . . . . . USIA  
LGen John J. Davis, USA . . . . . ACDA  
MGen Russell E. Dougherty, USAF. . . . . OASD/ISA  
MGen W. T. Fairbourn, USMC . . . . . JCS (J-5)  
Mr. Daniel J. Fink . . . . . DDR&E  
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher . . . . . ACDA  
Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff . . . . . State  
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC . . . . . USMC  
Dr. Morton H. Halperin . . . . . OASD/ISA  
General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF . . . . . USAF  
General Harold K. Johnson, USA . . . . . USA  
Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. . . . . White House  
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Ambassador Foy D. Kohler . . . . . State  
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VAdm Vernon L. Lowrance, USN . . . . . DIA  
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RAdm W. M. McCormick, USN . . . . . JCS (SAAC)  
MGen John B. McPherson, USAF . . . . . JCS (J-3)  
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Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN . . . . . CINCLANT  
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Mr. Walter J. Stoessel . . . . . State  
VAdm Rufus L. Taylor, USN . . . . . CIA  
VAdm Waldemar F. A. Wendt, USN . . . . . USN  
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA . . . . . JCS

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Mr. Robert W. Bean . . . . . Treasury  
BGen J. S. Billups, Jr., USA . . . . . CINCNORAD  
Col David W. Borchert, USAF . . . . . CINCSAC  
Mr. Paul A. Cheek . . . . . CIA  
Capt H. T. Crusser, III, USN . . . . . CINCLANT  
Mr. Daniel I. Davidson . . . . . State  
LCol John B. Desmond, USA . . . . . JCS (J-3)  
Col C. W. Drye, USA . . . . . NSA  
Dr. Ronald L. Easley . . . . . DDR&E  
Capt August W. Elliott, Jr., USN . . . . . JCS (CSG)  
Mr. Harold A. Feiveson . . . . . ACDA  
Col Thomas L. Fisher, II, USAF . . . . . OASD/ISA  
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Mr. Harry E. Gordon . . . . . CIA  
Mr. Sidney M. Graybeal . . . . . ACDA  
Capt C. H. Griffiths, USN . . . . . USN  
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Capt Sanford L. Knotts, USN . . . . . JCS (CSSG)  
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Col Haakon Lindjord, USA . . . . . OASD/ISA  
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BGen Everett A. McDonald, USAF . . . . . USAF  
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Mr. Marlin W. Remick . . . . . USIA  
Col Ira B. Richards, Jr., USA . . . . . ACDA  
Mr. Kenneth E. Roberts . . . . . OASD/ISA  
Col William F. Scott, USAF . . . . . USAF  
Mr. Albert L. Seligmann . . . . . State  
LCol William F. Skidmore, USA . . . . . DIA  
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Mr. Richard E. Topping . . . . . CIA  
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GAME STAFF ORGANIZATION

(COLD WAR DIVISION, JWGA)

Game Staff Representative Control	Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA
Game Staff Representative Control	Col Robert M. Smith, USA
Game Staff Representative Soviet Union Team - BETA I	LCol Walter S. Seadler, USAF
Game Staff Representative United States Team - BETA I	Cdr Joseph W. Benn, Jr., USN
Game Staff Representative Soviet Union Team - BETA II	LCol Ransom E. Barber, USA
Game Staff Representative United States Team - BETA II	LCol Lyle E. Mann, USAF
Game Manager	Cdr Kenneth N. Bebb, USN

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
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GAME ADMINISTRATION

NCOIC, Administrative Support	TSgt Haywood Vaughn, Jr., USAF
Administrative NCO	YN1C William H. Stoddard, USN (Temporary duty from USN)
Intelligence Technician	SSgt Joseph Raimond, Jr., USAF
Administrative Assistant	SP/4 Roger W. Amidon, Jr., USA
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